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DETAINER SYSTEM IN STATE COURTS
Sean Turley*
Abstract
As long as the future of federal immigration policy remains unsettled and 
the use of ICE detainers to capture and deport suspected noncitizens remains 
widespread, practitioners should focus their attention on waging a frontal assault 
against the legality of ICE detainers on state law grounds by arguing that they 
constitute warrantless arrests that are prohibited by state statute. The recent 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decision in Lunn v. Commonwealth 
provides a model for how to wage such an attack—not only in states with similar 
common law and statutory frameworks that are unlikely to resolve the issue 
legislatively, like Maine, but also in states with legislatures diametrically opposed 
to placing any limitations on local law enforcement agencies’ abilities to effectuate 
federal immigration policy, like Texas. The fact that the reasoning in Lunn can be 
exported beyond Massachusetts’ borders suggests that state courts are likely to 
serve as an important front in the fight against the legality of ICE detainers and to 
provide a rare opportunity for practitioners opposed to the Trump administration’s 
draconian immigration policies to disrupt one of its primary mechanisms for 
arresting and deporting suspected noncitizens.
I. INTRODUCTION
President Trump’s promise to severely curtail illegal immigration1 and his 
administration’s renewal of the controversial Secure Communities program2 has 
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to Sue Roche, Philip Mantis, Kate Chesney, and the rest of the staff at the Immigrant Legal Advocacy 
Project for an invaluable experience working in immigrant law and for bringing these cases to the 
author’s attention. The author also thanks Anna Welch, Richard Chen, and Jana Kenney for their 
helpful feedback and support throughout the writing process.
1 See Michael D. Shear & Ron Nixon, New Trump Deportation Rules Allow Far More Expulsions,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2m4lcIO (“President Trump has directed his administration 
to enforce the nation’s immigration laws more aggressively, unleashing the full force of the federal 
government to find, arrest and deport those in the country illegally, regardless of whether they have 
committed serious crimes.”).
2 The Obama administration launched the “Secure Communities” program in the summer of 2009 
to facilitate the sharing of fingerprint information that local police already collected and provided to the 
FBI with the Department of Homeland Security, which, in turn, furnished a mechanism by which ICE 
could check arrestees’ immigration status and issue a detainer to hold the arrestee until ICE could take 
custody. See Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Policing Immigration, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 87, 94 (2013).  
Present Obama expanded the program during his first term but after facing increasing scrutiny, the 
administration ultimately replaced it with the Priority Enforcement Program, which refocused ICE’s 
attention on the arrest and deportation of noncitizens convicted of criminal offenses but kept the same 
biometric data sharing system and the procedures for issuing detainers as its predecessor. See, e.g.,
Barbara E. Armacost, “Sanctuary” Laws: The New Immigration Federalism, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV.
1197, 1209–10 (2016); Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Secretary, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland 
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brought the legality of Immigration and Custom Enforcement (ICE) detainers3 to 
the forefront of the national debate surrounding proper immigration enforcement. 
It has become a hotly contested issue in several states,4 particularly in light of 
recent federal court decisions that suggest that an ICE detainer is an 
unconstitutional violation of the Fourth Amendment’s protection against 
unreasonable seizures5 and the Trump administration’s increasing use of them as a 
means to execute its draconian approach to preventing illegal immigration.6 The 
                                                                                                                                      
Sec., Secure Communities (Nov. 20, 2014), available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_secure_communities.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WXQ2-ZHG2]. President Trump resurrected the Secure Communities program 
through an Executive Order four days into his presidency. Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8700 
(Jan. 25, 2017) (“The Secretary shall immediately take all appropriate action to terminate the Priority 
Enforcement Program . . . and to reinstitute the immigration program known as ‘Secure 
Communities.’”).
3 ICE detainers serve as a “request” for a state or local law enforcement agency (LEA) to detain a 
noncitizen “when gaining immediate physical custody is either impracticable or impossible.” 8 C.F.R. §
287.7(a); see Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 396, 410 (2012); City of Santa Clara v. Trump, 
250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 510 (N.D. Cal. 2017).  Only ICE officers can issue detainers.  Memorandum from 
Acting ICE Director Thomas D. Homan, Issuance of Immigration Detainers by ICE Immigration 
Officers (Mar. 24, 2017).  This detention cannot exceed 48 hours in duration, excluding weekends and 
holidays. § 287.7(d).  Although § 287.7(d) includes the phrase “such agency shall maintain custody of 
the alien” (emphasis added), compliance with a detainer is always voluntary. Villars v. Kubiatowski, 45 
F. Supp. 3d 791, 802 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (“[E]very federal court of appeals that has considered the nature of 
ICE detainers characterizes them as ‘requests’ that impose no mandatory obligation on the part of the
detainer’s recipient.”); see Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 640 (3d Cir. 2014) (“The words ‘shall 
maintain custody,’ in the context of the regulations as a whole, appear next to the use of the world 
‘request’ throughout the regulation[,] [meaning] it is hard to read the use of the word ‘shall’ in the 
timing section to change the nature of the entry regulation.”).  ICE issued over 400,000 detainers 
annually in 2012 and 2013, which was double the number from a decade prior and twenty times as 
frequently as in the 1980s. Spencer E. Amdur, The Right of Refusal: Immigration Enforcement and the 
New Cooperative Federalism, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 87, 106 (2016). 
4 Caitlin Dickerson, A Sheriff’s Bind: Cross the White House, or the Courts, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13,
2017), https://nyti.ms/2xZbCZs [https://perma.cc/6FLN-FTY8
] (“The political jockeying [between local LEAs and the federal government] is rooted in a vexing 
constitutional disconnect between criminal justice and immigration enforcement . . . .”). Kim Geiger, 
Rauner signs immigration, automatic voter registration bills into law, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Aug. 28, 
2017), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/politics/ct-bruce-rauner-immigration-voting-met-
0829-20170828-story.html [https://perma.cc/29EW-DJQC] (discussing Illinois’s decision to adopt the 
Trust Act, which forbids LEAs from honoring ICE detainers).
5 The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects citizens and noncitizens alike. 
See generally Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973); Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 
149 (1923); Kate M. Manuel, Cong. Research Serv., Report No. R42690, Immigration Detainers: Legal 
Issues, at 18 (2015) (“[Noncitizens] have been found to be entitled to the protections of the Fourth and 
Fifth Amendments because they are encompassed by the usage of the word ‘person’ in those 
amendments.”).  In the past several years, courts across the country have held that ICE detainers violate 
noncitizens’ Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures because the 
federal power to regulate immigration is “subject to important constitutional limitations.” Zadvydas v. 
Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001); see City of Santa Clara, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 510 (noting that “[s]everal 
courts have held that it is a violation of the Fourth Amendment for local jurisdictions to hold suspected 
or actual removable aliens subject to civil detainer requests . . . .”); Ochoa v. Campbell, 266 F. Supp. 3d 
1237, 1258–59 (E.D. Wash. 2017) (“Courts around the country have held that local law enforcement 
officials violate the Fourth Amendment when they temporarily detain individuals for immigration 
violations without probable cause.”).
6 After the issuance of detainers gradually decreased during the Obama administration from its 
peak in 2011, the Trump administration immediately ramped up their use—leading to a 31.7 percent 
jump between January and March of 2017. Use of ICE Detainers: Obama vs. Trump,
TRACIMMIGRATION, (Aug. 30, 2017), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/479/
[https://perma.cc/4D2C-4ZMN].
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Trump administration has vociferously opposed any reluctance by local law 
enforcement agencies (LEAs) or states to honor ICE detainers by threatening to 
withhold federal funding to communities that do not abide by detainer requests,7
even though such a move risks infringing on Tenth Amendment protections against 
the commandeering of LEAs to do the federal government’s bidding.8 Responses 
by LEAs across the nation have been mixed.  Some have decided to disregard ICE 
detainers given their apparent unconstitutionality.9 Others have tried to cooperate 
with the Justice Department in order to blunt the impact of the adverse federal court 
decisions by claiming that ICE immediately takes custody of the noncitizens who 
are arrested because they are placed in a cell rented by federal immigration 
authorities.10 State legislatures have also entered the fray, with some passing bills 
to compel local police officials to honor ICE detainers by penalizing departments 
that disregard them11 and others enacting legislation that explicitly prevent LEAs 
from abiding by detainer requests.12
While most of the discussion at the national level about detainers has 
focused on the practice’s constitutionality,13 less attention has been paid to the 
intersection of ICE detainers with state law. The recent decision by the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Lunn v. Commonwealth14 provides a 
model for how opponents of federal immigration policy can use state courts to 
undercut one of ICE’s primary means of executing its crackdown and to provide 
                                                                                                                                      
7 Julie H. Davis & Charlie Savage, White House to States: Shield the Undocumented and Lose 
Police Funding, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2ob7TUw; Vivian Yee, Judge Blocks 
Trump Effort to Withhold Money from Sanctuary Cities, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2017), 
https://nyti.ms/2piGzqA [https://perma.cc/3NWG-Y3MC].  The threat to withhold funding relates to 
non-detainer spending, as the federal government does not reimburse LEAs for honoring detainers. City 
of Santa Clara, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 511.
8 If federal authorities were to mandate that state and local LEAs needed to act as agents of the 
federal government by requiring them to abide by ICE detainers, then that policy may violate the Tenth 
Amendment’s protections against the “commandeering” of local officials to implement federal law. 
Galarza, 745 F.3d at 643 (“[T]he federal government cannot command the government agencies of the 
states to imprison persons of interest to federal officials.”); see generally Printz v. United States, 521 
U.S. 898, 922 (“The power of the Federal Government would be augmented immeasurably if it were 
able to impress into its service—and at no cost to itself—the police officers of the 50 states.”). 
9 Dickerson, supra, note 4 (“At least four state legislatures and many more cities and counties have 
considered enacting . . . laws [that restrict extended jail holds or ban them altogether] this year.”).
10 Caitlin Dickerson, Trump Administration Moves to Expand Deportation Dragnet to Jails, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 21, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2vQTOBC [https://perma.cc/WZ8Z-V7FU] (“The Trump 
administration is working with like-minded sheriffs from around the country on a plan to channel 
undocumented immigrants from local jails into federal detention . . . [with] [t]he legal argument [being] 
that the arrangement effectively makes the immigrant a detainee of ICE, not the sheriff’s 
department . . . .”).
11 James Barragán, Appeals Court Rules Parts of Texas’ Sanctuary Cities Ban Can Go Into Effect,
DALL. MORNING NEWS (Sept. 25, 2017), 
https://www.dallasnews.com/news/politics/2017/09/25/appeals-court-rules-parts-texas-sanctuary-cities-
ban-can-go-effect [https://perma.cc/GKB8-L4VQ] (discussing a recent Fifth Circuit opinion ruling that 
Texas could implement part of a bill passed in 2017 that prohibited states from disobeying ICE detainers 
or failing to cooperate with federal immigration officials).
12 Kim Geiger, Rauner Signs Immigration, Automatic Voter Registration Bills Into Law, CHICAGO 
TRIBUNE (Aug. 28, 2017), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/politics/ct-bruce-rauner-
immigration-voting-met-0829-20170828-story.html [https://perma.cc/DU9P-7XVQ] (discussing the 
passage of a bill forbidding Illinois police departments from honoring ICE detainers). 
13 Michael Kagan, Immigration Law’s Looming Fourth Amendment Problem, 104 GEO. L.J. 125, 
128 (2015) (noting that these cases have provided a new means to “attack immigration enforcement on 
the front end.”).
14 78 N.E.3d 1143 (Mass. 2017).
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legal support for the increasing number of local sheriffs and communities who have 
refused to honor detainers. 
In Lunn, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled that 
Massachusetts’s LEAs act without sufficient legal justification when they comply 
with ICE detainers by holding suspected noncitizens beyond the period of 
incarceration imposed for the original charge that landed them in custody.15
According to the court, when LEAs comply with ICE detainers and maintain 
custody of noncitizens, they have, in effect, “arrested” those noncitizens for civil
violations of immigration law (i.e., unlawful presence) without a warrant, and by 
maintaining custody of them without sufficient cause for such an arrest, the police 
departments violate Massachusetts law.16
Lunn ultimately matters because it shows that state court rulings may bar 
LEAs from honoring ICE detainers, as doing so would clearly violate state laws 
that limit their authority to execute warrantless arrests for civil violations of federal 
law.17 The fact that the logic behind this holding can be exported to other states 
transforms a case that may at first appear to be a limited regional victory into a 
national battle cry for practitioners to launch a frontal assault against the ICE 
detainer system through state courts.18
This Note will illustrate that Lunn’s summary and application of the 
relevant federal and state law provides a model strategy for attacking ICE detainers 
in other states with slightly different common law precedents and statutory 
language by applying it to Maine. Maine provides an interesting case study for a 
couple of reasons. For one, the divided nature of its government,19 the divisiveness 
of Maine’s political process,20 and Governor Paul LePage’s ardent opposition to 
illegal immigration21 make it quite unlikely that the state will pass a law that 
                                                                                                                                      
15 Id. at 1146. 
16 Id. Although the civil nature of unlawful presence is not disputed, see Arizona v. United States, 
567 U.S. 387, 396 (2012), it is still possible—if not probable—that LEAs may not understand this fact.  
Because civil immigration detainer notices are reported in the National Crime Information Center 
(NCIC) system—which is primarily used to “notify law enforcement of strictly criminal warrants and/or 
criminal matters”—it is likely that LEAs are unaware that presence without legal status is a non-
criminal matter. Major City Chiefs Immigration Committee, M.C.C. Immigration Committee 
Recommendations (June, 2006), available at http://www.houstontx.gov/police/pdfs/mcc_position.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4PLJ-T5UJ] (warning that the use of the NCIC system to distribute detainers “has 
created confusion . . . and in fact lays a trap for unwary officers who believe them to be valid criminal 
warrants or detainers.”).
17 Lunn, 78 N.E.3d at 1146.
18 The concept of attacking the legality of ICE detainers at all—even as a violation of federal 
law—is a relatively novel approach because for years little precedent supported such a strategy.  See 
Kagan, supra note 13, at 128 (“The new wave of federal cases are different because they find 
constitutional weakness with the way in which immigrants are taken into custody, not just with how 
long they are detained.  They attack immigration enforcement on the front end.”).  Fighting against ICE 
detainers at the state level, then, offers a new method of attack in a conflict that has been primarily 
dominated by a debate about constitutional rights.
19 Scott Thistle, Republicans Hold Majority in Maine Senate, Draw Nearly Even with Democrats 
in House, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Nov. 10, 2016), 
http://www.pressherald.com/2016/11/10/republicans-hold-majority-in-maine-senate-draw-nearly-even-
with-democrats-in-house/ [https://perma.cc/4FTC-U8ZJ].
20 See, e.g., Scot Lehigh, In Maine, It’s LePage Against the Legislature, BOS. GLOBE (July 9, 
2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2015/07/09/maine-paul-lepage-against-
legislature/Bv6xSVAMoHSIHHLbsFULPO/story.html https://perma.cc/ZL8M-BZVV]. 
21LePage has a history of expressing his vehement opposition to illegal immigration by claiming—
without evidence—that “illegals” hurt Maine by spreading disease and draining funds from the state's 
welfare program. See, e.g., Joe Lawlor, State Won’t Name Restaurant Where Worker Had Hepatitis A, 
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clarifies the legality of LEAs honoring detainers under state law. 
Secondly, the common criminal law foundation in Maine is relatively 
similar but not identical to that of Massachusetts, making the comparison and 
application of Lunn apt. The issue is especially pertinent in Maine after the debate 
over honoring detainers recently flared up when the Cumberland County Sheriff,
Kevin Joyce, decided to follow in the footsteps of several of his fellow sheriffs 
across the country22 by refusing to honor ICE detainers without an accompanying 
judicial warrant because fulfilling them “could violate the individual’s Fourth 
Amendment right and we could ultimately be sued for false imprisonment.”23
Although Sheriff Joyce’s fear is well-founded,24 Governor LePage quickly 
denounced Joyce’s decision and promised to remove from office any sheriff who 
do not work with ICE because he believes that their refusal to cooperate violates 
Maine law.25 LePage’s insistence makes the holding and logic of Lunn particularly 
                                                                                                                                      
PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Nov. 1, 2014), http://www.pressherald.com/2014/10/31/maine-cdc-
restaurant-worker-may-have-exposed-patrons-to-hepatitis-a [https://perma.cc/TEY6-WV5W] (reporting 
on LePage’s statement that he had “been trying to get [President Obama] to pay attention to the illegals 
in our country because there’s been a spike in hepatitis C, tuberculosis and HIV, but it’s going on deaf 
ears”); see also Amanda Hoover, Maine Governor Says He Is Suing “Illegal Immigrant,” Not the 
President, BOSTON.COM (Aug. 12, 2015), https://www.boston.com/news/politics/2015/08/12/maine-
governor-says-he-is-suing-illegal-immigrants-not-the-president [https://perma.cc/4SJT-K86K] (noting 
that LePage denied that his personal lawsuit in opposition to Obama’s 2014 executive order shielding 
some noncitizens from deportation was filed against the President, but instead against “illegal 
immigrants taking state money against state and federal laws”).
22 See, e.g., Noelle Phillips, Colorado Sheriffs Say They Will Not Be Shamed by New ICE Naughty 
List, DENVER POST (Mar. 22, 2017), http://www.denverpost.com/2017/03/22/colorado-sheriffs-wont-be-
shamed-ice-naughty-list [https://perma.cc/8E9R-4M5M] (discussing resistance amongst Colorado 
sheriffs to honoring ICE detainers); Joel Rubin & Paloma Esquivel, For Some California Sheriffs, It’s 
Not Politics Stopping Them from Fully Helping ICE: It’s The Legal Risk, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2017), 
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ice-detainers-sheriffs-20170330-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/N3DN-9E8H] (noting that none of California’s Fifty-eight county sheriffs honor ICE 
detainers).
23 Jake Bleiberg, Maine Sheriff Won’t Detain Inmates Any Longer for Immigration Agents,
BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Sept. 26, 2017), https://bangordailynews.com/2017/09/20/politics/maine-sheriff-
says-he-wont-detain-inmates-longer-for-immigration-agents [https://perma.cc/2SFA-MQMB]; see also 
Matt Byrne, Cumberland County Jail Stops Holding Some Inmates for Immigration Agents, PORTLAND 
PRESS HERALD (Sept. 20, 2017), http://www.pressherald.com/2017/09/20/sheriff-joyce-stops-holding-
some-inmates-at-request-of-immigration-agents [https://perma.cc/9K9P-EHZL].
24 Recent ICE Detainer Cases, ACLU IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS PROJECT (July 25, 2015), 
https://www.aclu.org/other/recent-ice-detainer-cases (listing eight cases resulting in significant 
monetary settlements or damages against local police for honoring ICE detainers); Galarza v. Szalczyk, 
745 F.3d 634, 645 (3d Cir. 2014) (“[The LEA] was free to disregard the ICE detainer, and it therefore 
cannot use a defense that its own policy did not cause the deprivation of [the noncitizen’s] constitutional 
rights.”).
25 Edward D. Murray, LePage Says He’ll Remove Sheriffs Who Refuse To Hold Certain Inmates 
for Immigration Agents, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Sept. 25, 2017), 
http://www.pressherald.com/2017/09/25/lepage-says-he-will-remove-maine-sheriff-for-refusing-to-
hold-prisoners-for-immigration-agents [https://perma.cc/QH44-33DJ] (“We have a couple sheriffs who 
say they’re not going to be working with ICE . . . [and] unbeknownst to them, the Maine Constitution 
says if they don’t follow state law, that I can remove them.”).  Maine’s constitution states that 
“[w]henever the Governor . . . shall find that a sheriff is not faithfully or efficiently performing any duty 
imposed upon the sheriff by law, the Governor may remove such sheriff from office and appoint another 
sheriff to serve for the remainder of the term for which such removed sheriff was elected.” ME. CONST.
art. IX, § 10.  LePage has since publicly deferred to Maine state courts regarding the matter but has not 
yet changed his stance that he will fire the sheriffs for not honoring ICE detainers. Fred Bever, 
Governor Says He’ll “Let Courts Decide” If Holding Released Inmates for ICE Violates Civil Rights,
ME. PUBLIC (Sept. 28, 2017), http://mainepublic.org/post/governor-says-hell-let-courts-decide-if-
holding-released-inmates-ice-violates-civil-rights [https://perma.cc/Z9U6-8WQU]. 
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important to how this conflict will be resolved in Maine. If, contrary to LePage’s 
assertion, ICE detainers violate state law, then LePage will not be able to fire the 
sheriffs; but if state courts find that ICE detainers accord with common law, 
LePage will be able to use the threat of firing sheriffs to chill any resistance. 
Because this stand-off between county sheriffs and the governor in Maine is 
emblematic of conflicts within states across the country regarding the proper 
response to changing federal immigration priorities in general and the increasing 
number of cases challenging the constitutionality of ICE detainers in particular, 
analyzing the legality of these detainers through the state law lens provides a 
critical insight into how the battle over the legality of ICE detainers can be waged 
at the local level, regardless of how federal courts eventually decide the issue.26
The purpose of this Note, then, is to illustrate how Lunn provides a new 
front on which opponents of current federal immigration policies can attack the 
legality of ICE detainers in order to either significantly curtail or outright end the 
practice. It may be easy to imagine after just a cursory review of the Lunn case that 
the court’s holding is simply a result of the peculiarities of Massachusetts common 
law or a byproduct of the state’s liberal bent.27 But that is not an accurate reading. 
Instead, this Note will demonstrate that the revolutionary logic in Lunn is easily 
exportable to other states because it is founded in generally accepted common law 
principles, thereby extending its ramifications far beyond the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts. Put simply, the holding in Lunn suggests that now is the 
appropriate time for opponents of ICE detainers to use state courts to fight against
the ICE detainer system.
Part II of this Note will introduce this argument by walking through an 
exegesis of Lunn to show how the case is revolutionary for being the first of its 
kind to synthesize the relevant federal case law and apply it within a state law 
context, and for how it establishes a model for practitioners to follow in order to 
attack ICE detainers in other states’ courts. Part III will demonstrate the general 
exportability of Lunn to states with similar common law frameworks by 
demonstrating that ICE detainers most likely violate Maine state law because (a) 
holding noncitizens in accordance with an ICE detainer qualifies as an “arrest”; (b) 
no Maine statute or common law precedent justify an arrest for civil violations of 
                                                                                                                                      
26 It is conceivable that Republicans in Congress and the White House will attempt to undercut 
“sanctuary city” policies through legislation, especially after a federal judge blocked the Justice 
Department’s attempt to unilaterally deny funding to these communities. See generally Eli Rosenberg, 
Federal Judge Blocks Trump’s Executive Order on Denying Funding to Sanctuary Cities, WASH. POST
(Nov. 21, 2017), http://wapo.st/2zXBxmt?tid=ss_tw-bottom&utm_term=.e3489bfae20c 
[https://perma.cc/74M5-JMGS] (reviewing U.S. District Judge William H. Orrick’s final decision to 
permanently block Executive Order 13768, which revoked financial support to so-called “sanctuary 
cities”).  The House has already passed Kate’s Law, which attempts to criminalize reentry by a 
noncitizen who has been deported or denied admission, or who has departed the United States, and the 
No Sanctuary for Criminals Act, which punishes states and localities that do not comply with the 
carrying out of federal immigration policy—including ICE detainer requests—by denying them a 
variety of grants and other monetary assistance. Kate’s Law, H.R. 3004, 115th Cong. (2017); No 
Sanctuary for Criminals Act, H.R. 3003, 115 Cong. (2017).  The fact that state common law precedent is 
likely to change much more slowly means that it provides a relatively more stable foundation on which
to launch an attack against ICE detainers. 
27 See Jim O’Sullivan, Massachusetts: Even More Liberal Than You Thought, BOS. GLOBE (July 
31, 2014), https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/politics/2014/07/31/massachusetts-even-more-liberal-
than-you-thought/HCk5j2MZ7b64zmi3SZiKzH/story.html [https://perma.cc/SY9T-TC3X] (noting that 
Massachusetts stereotypes include “Taxachusetts,” “[t]he bluest state,” and “[a] vegetarian convention,” 
and are all “well-earned” given poll results in the state). 
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federal immigration law without a warrant; and (c) no current federal law gives 
Maine’s LEAs the authority to conduct such arrests. Lastly, this Note will 
conclude by advocating for opponents of current immigration policy to launch a
challenge against ICE detainers in state courts by couching their arguments in 
terms of how the practice violate state law prohibitions against warrantless arrests 
for civil offenses and by discussing the possible barricades that proponents of ICE 
detainers may erect to protect them from attack.  
II. THE REVOLUTIONARY NATURE OF LUNN V. COMMONWEALTH
The facts in the Lunn case are relatively simple. Sreynuon Lunn, a 
noncitizen without legal status and subject to a final order of removal, was 
originally arrested for a single count of unarmed robbery in October 2016.28
Before his arraignment in Boston Municipal Court, the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) issued a detainer to Boston’s police department and any subsequent 
LEAs that might hold him to keep him in their custody for an additional two days 
beyond when he would otherwise be released so ICE could arrest him.29 After 
failing to post bail, the Suffolk County Sheriff's Office held Lunn while he awaited 
trial.30 When a judge dismissed the case against him for lack of prosecution, 
Lunn’s attorney requested that he be released, but the judge declined.31 Lunn 
remained in court custody in a holding cell until several hours later, at which point 
ICE took him into federal custody.32 Lunn’s attorney promptly filed a petition to 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, alleging that the trial court officers had 
violated Lunn’s federal constitutional rights by detaining him.33
The court in Lunn classified the detention of a person in response to an 
ICE detainer as a warrantless arrest34 for a civil violation of federal immigration 
                                                                                                                                      
28 Lunn v. Commonwealth, 78 N.E.3d. 1143, 1147 (Mass. 2017).
29 Id.
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 1148.
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id.at 1153.  Federal law authorizes ICE officers to issue detainers without a warrant, and even if 
a warrant is issued, there is no review by a neutral and detached magistrate to determine if sufficient 
probable cause exists. Memorandum from Acting ICE Director Thomas D. Homan, Issuance of 
Immigration Detainers by ICE Immigration Officers(Mar. 24, 2017) (noting that issuing a warrant with 
a detainer “is not legally required”); Kagan, supra note 13, at 157 (“Immigration arrest warrants [that 
may accompany detainers] do not include review and authorization by a judicial officer, nor by any 
other neutral adjudicator such as an immigration judge. In immigration enforcement, the ‘warrant’ 
issues with the officer's signature alone.”).  Instead an ICE officer fills out form I-247A 
“IMMIGRATION DETAINER – NOTICE OF ACTION,” which states that “DHS HAS 
DETERMINED THAT PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTS THAT THE SUBJECT IS A REMOVABLE 
ALIEN” and lists four possible justifications: (1) the existence of a “final order of removal against the 
alien”; (2) “[t]he pendency of ongoing removal proceedings against the alien”; (3) “[b]iometric 
confirmation of the alien’s identity and a records check of federal databases”; or (4) the presence of 
“other reliable evidence that affirmatively indicate[s] [that] the alien either lacks immigration status 
or . . . is removable under U.S. immigration law.” U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, DHS Form I-247A, 
Notice of Action (Mar. 2017).  The problem is that removability is not sufficient to justify a noncitizen’s 
arrest by local LEAs. Santos v. Frederick City Bd. of Comm’rs, 725 F.3d 451, 464-65 (4th Cir. 2013) 
(“Lower federal courts have universally and we think correctly interpreted Arizona v. United States as 
precluding local law enforcement officers from arresting individuals solely based on known or 
suspected civil immigration violations.”).  In an attempt to address this deficiency, DHS recently 
changed its detainer policy so that future detainer requests will be accompanied by I-200 “Warrant for 
Arrest of Alien” or I-205 “Warrant of Removal/Deportation” forms. Memorandum from Acting ICE 
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law.35 Failing to find a legal justification for a warrantless arrest for a civil 
violation of federal immigration law either explicitly36 or implicitly37 in federal 
law38 or specifically in state law,39 the Lunn court held that because no state or 
federal statute authorized LEAs in Massachusetts to arrest suspected noncitizens 
for civil violations of federal immigration law, holding noncitizens beyond the time 
for which there is a preexisting legal justification is unlawful in the state.40
The reason why this seemingly state-specific holding is so revolutionary 
for the national debate about ICE detainers is in the way the justices analyzed their 
                                                                                                                                      
Director Thomas D. Homan, Issuance of Immigration Detainers by ICE Immigration Officers(Mar. 24, 
2017).  This new form does not cure the constitutional defect as this “warrant” can also be issued by an 
ICE officer without a probable cause determination by a neutral magistrate. Ochoa v. Campbell, 266 F. 
Supp. 3d 1237, 1252 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (“[T]he probable cause determination here was made by an ICE 
officer, not a neutral magistrate.”); Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas City, No. 3:12-CV-02317-ST, 2014 
WL 1414305, at *11 (D. Or. Apr. 11, 2014) (“But the ICE detainer alone did not demonstrate probable 
cause to hold [the noncitizen] . . . . It stated only that an investigation ‘has been initiated’ to determine 
whether she was subject to removal from the United States.”).
As a result, courts have consistently classified arrests stemming from an ICE detainer as 
warrantless, which the federal government has conceded in previous litigation. Cervantez v. Whitfield,
776 F.2d 556, 559-60 (1985) (recording a stipulation by the federal government that “an immigration 
hold is an arrest without [a] warrant.”); Moreno v. Napolitano,213 F. Supp. 3d 999, 1005 (N.D. Ill. 
2016) (stating that the federal defendants in the case “concede[d] that being detained pursuant to an . . . 
immigration detainer constitutes a warrantless arrest."); see generally Kagan, supra note 13, at 161 (“In 
immigration, ‘warrants’ are signed only by the law enforcement agency, so that in criminal law terms 
immigration enforcement makes warrantless arrests the norm.”).  These warrantless arrests are assumed 
to be unreasonable under federal law. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978) (“The Fourth 
Amendment proscribes all unreasonable searches and seizures, and it is a cardinal principle that 
‘searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per 
se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment . . . .’” (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 
(1967))).
35 Lunn, 78 N.E.3d at 1155.  Although entry into the country is a misdemeanor criminal offense, 
INA § 275(a), presence without legal status is a civil violation that may render the noncitizen 
deportable. INA § 237(a)(1)(B); Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 396, 407 (2012) (“Removal [of 
noncitizens] is a civil, not criminal, matter” because “[a]s a general rule, it is not a crime for a 
removable alien to remain in the United States.”); Hinds v. Lynch, 790 F.3d 259, 264 (1st Cir. 2015) 
(“th[is] Court has ‘consistently classified’ removal ‘as a civil rather than a criminal procedure’” (quoting 
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594 (1952))); Ochoa v. Campbell, 266 F. Supp. 3d 1237, 
1247 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (“A warrant issued under this discretionary authority [by ICE] is necessarily a 
warrant for civil—as opposed to criminal—immigration enforcement.”).
36 Lunn, 78 N.E.3d. at 1159 (“In those limited instances where [INA § 287(g)] affirmatively grants 
authority to State and local officers to arrest, it does so in . . . explicit terms . . . .”).
37 The court dismissed the notion that states possess “inherent authority” to “cooperate” with 
federal officials in implementing federal immigration law in light of Arizona v. United States. Id. at 
1157 (“Where neither our common law nor any of our statutes recognizes the power to arrest for Federal 
civil immigration offenses, we should be wary about reading our law’s silence as a basis for 
affirmatively recognizing a new power to arrest . . . under the amorphous rubric of ‘implicit’ or 
‘inherent’ authority”).  The court also rejected the idea that “287(g) agreements”—which allow police to 
serve as immigration officers but only after receiving specialized training and when supervised by the 
Attorney General—provided a mechanism through which the federal government can grant the authority 
necessary to arrest noncitizens for civil violations of immigration laws, particularly when there is no 
controlling state law on the books. Id. at 1159.
38 Lunn, 78 N.E.3d. at 1159.
39 Id. at 1155 (“Conspicuously absent from [Massachusetts] common law is any authority (in 
absence of a statute) for police officers to arrest generally for civil matters, let alone authority to arrest 
specifically for federal civil immigration matters.”); see generally Santos v. Frederick City Bd. of 
Comm’rs, 725 F.3d 451, 465 (4th Cir. 2013) (“[A]bsent express direction or authorization by federal 
statute or federal officials, state and local law enforcement officers may not detain or arrest an 
individual solely based on known or suspected civil violations of federal immigration law.”).
40 Lunn, 78 N.E.3d. at 1146.
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illegality not just in terms of federal constitutional law—by aggregating and 
clarifying the logic behind several recent federal court decisions—but also by 
viewing the issue through the lens of state common and statutory law. The court’s 
approach demonstrates the vulnerability of ICE detainers to an important new angle 
of attack. Although the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court did not discuss the 
broader implications of its holding, the outcome in Lunn is provocative and 
inspiring for practitioners in any state that shares a common state law foundation 
with Massachusetts and that is either unlikely to resolve this dispute through the 
legislative process (like Maine) or ruled by a conservative majority who may try to 
compel LEAs to honor ICE detainers without considering the state law implications 
(like Texas). 
III. THE MAINE CASE STUDY: APPLYING LUNN WITHIN ANOTHER STATE’S
STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW FRAMEWORK
The degree to which Lunn can be exported to another state—such as 
Maine—will ultimately hinge on three key legal issues: (1) whether maintaining 
custody of a noncitizen after the expiration of any preexisting state law justification 
qualifies as an “arrest” under state law; (2) whether any state statute or common 
law precedent provides the legal authorization that is necessary for LEAs to 
conduct warrantless arrests for civil violations of federal immigration law; and (3)
whether any current federal law might provide the necessary legal justification. As 
this Note will demonstrate in this section, the fact that the detention of a noncitizen 
in accordance with an ICE detainer qualifies as an arrest under Maine law41 and 
neither Maine state common or statutory law, or federal law adequately authorize 
LEAs to conduct such warrantless arrests for civil violations of federal immigration 
law.42 This means not only that ICE detainers appear to violate Maine state law but 
also that Lunn can be used as a weapon against ICE detainers in a state with a
slightly different statutory system and common law precedent.
A. Holding a Noncitizen in Custody in Accordance with an ICE Detainer is an 
“Arrest” under Maine State Law
The use of the word “detainer” by ICE officers to describe their requests 
for local police departments to hold suspected noncitizens is deceptive because 
“detention” and “arrest” are related yet distinct concepts under the Fourth 
Amendment of the Constitution.43 Although a “detainer” conceptually involves 
“detention,” it resembles an “arrest” in practice because a “detention” involves a 
momentary or limited seizure of a person based on reasonable suspicion while an 
arrest involves a longer period of custody justified by probable cause.44 Any new 
                                                                                                                                      
41 See discussion infra Section III.A. 
42 See discussion infra Sections III.B-C. 
43 See Morales v. Chadbourne, 793 F.3d 208, 217 (1st Cir. 2015) (“[W]hile a detainer is distinct 
from an arrest, it nevertheless results in the detention of an individual.”); Gonzalez v. City of Peoria, 
722 F.2d 468, 477 (9th Cir. 1983) overruled on other grounds by Hodgers–Durgin v. de la Vina, 199 
F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (noting that “‘Detention’ defines a special category of fourth 
amendment seizures that are substantially less intrusive than arrests . . . [but when] the defendant is 
transported to the police station and placed in a cell or interrogation room he has been arrested, even if 
the purpose of the seizure is investigatory rather than accusatory”).
44 “The Fourth Amendment prohibits government agents from detaining a person in the absence of 
probable cause,” Manuel v. City of Joliet, Ill., 137 S.Ct. 911, 918 (2017), and “requires a judicial 
2018] DEATH BY FIFTY CUTS                               245
arrest, such as by holding someone in accordance with an ICE detainer, requires a 
new probable cause finding separate from the justification for the initial arrest.45
Courts in Maine define a lawful arrest as including four components: 
(1) an intention on the part of an arresting officer then and 
there to make the arrest under a real or pretended authority; (2) 
a communication of that intention by the arresting officer to 
the one whose arrest is sought; (3) an understanding of that 
intention by the person who is to be arrested; and (4) the 
actual or constructive seizure or detention of the person to be 
arrested by one having the present power to control that 
person.46
This definition for arrest in Maine closely resembles the definition of “arrest” in 
Massachusetts.47 These definitions both incorporate (1) the officer’s intent; (2) the 
objective understanding of the person being arrested; and (3) the actual or 
constructive detention or seizure of a person.  They differ only slightly: Maine law 
includes an additional element by requiring that the arresting officer communicate 
his intention to arrest the arrestee while Massachusetts law does not.
Given the clear parallels between these definitions for an “arrest,” it is 
likely that a court in Maine would classify the detention of a noncitizen by police in 
accordance with an ICE detainer as an arrest under state law.  Although the police 
departments “detain” noncitizens for ICE, the nature of this detention resembles an 
arrest under the common law because the police department is seizing a person for 
a period beyond a simple investigatory stop.48 Additionally, the same common law 
language that led the court in Lunn to classify holding a noncitizen in compliance 
with an ICE detainer as an arrest exists in Maine’s common law, suggesting that a 
court in Maine would come to a similar conclusion.  The slight difference between 
the two definitions only involves communication between the arresting officer and 
the person being arrested. This does not fundamentally change the essential 
elements of an arrest because the outcome and the relevant mental states of the 
people involved remains unchanged even if this element was excluded from the 
                                                                                                                                      
determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following arrest.” 
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975). State v. Donatelli, 2010 ME 43, ¶ 11, 995, 995 A.2d 238 
(“[A] detention may amount to an arrest and is lawful only if it is supported by probable cause.”) 
(quoting State v. Langlois, 2005 ME 3, 863 A.2d 913, 916).
45 Morales, 793 F.3d at 217 (“Because [the noncitizen] was kept in custody for a new purpose after 
she was entitled to release, she was subjected to a new seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes—one 
that must be supported by a new probable cause justification.”); Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas County, 
No. 3:12-cv-02317-ST, 2014 WL 1414305, at *9 (D. Or. April 11, 2014) (“The seizures that allegedly 
violated [petitioner’s] Fourth Amendment rights were not a continuation of her initial arrest, but new 
seizures independent of the initial finding of probable cause for violating state law.”).
46 State v. Dorweiler, 2016 ME 73, ¶ 7, 143 A.3d 114 (quoting State v. Donahue, 420 A.2d 936, 
937 (Me. 1980)).
47 See Lunn v. Commonwealth, 78 N.E.3d. 1143, 1153 (Mass. 2017) (defining an “arrest” as 
occurring when “there is (1) an actual or constructive detention or seizure, (2) performed with the 
intention to effect an arrest, and (3) so understood by the person detained . . . [for which] [t]he 
subjective understanding of the officer or defendant does not control”).
48 See Donatelli, 2010 ME 43, ¶ 11, 995, 995 A.2d 238 (distinguishing between a brief 
investigatory stop and a “de facto arrest”); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968) (holding that LEAs to 
conduct brief investigatory stops without probable cause while reiterating the need for LEAs to establish 
probable cause before executing an arrest).
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definition. Critically, the federal government has conceded that holding a person 
for the purpose of abiding by an ICE detainer qualifies as a “warrantless arrest,”49
thereby weakening any argument they might make to the contrary. Therefore, it is 
fair to assume that when police departments hold a noncitizen in compliance with 
an ICE detainer, they have “arrested” that person under Maine state law. 
B. Maine Statutes and Common Law do not Grant Local Law Enforcement 
Officials the Power to Conduct Warrantless Arrests for Civil Violations of 
Immigration Law
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution50 and Article I, 
§ 5 of the Maine Constitution protect individuals from unlawful arrest in Maine.51
Maine’s Constitution specifically states that “the people shall be secure in their 
persons . . . from all unreasonable . . . seizures . . . and no warrant to . . . seize any 
person . . . shall be issue[d] without a specific designation . . . [of] the person . . . to 
be seized, nor without probable cause.”52 These protections arise only if the 
encounter between the police and the individual constitutes a seizure of the citizen 
to the point that the individual “is not free to walk away.”53 If the police do in fact 
conduct an arrest without adequate justification, they may be held liable under state 
law.54
The probable cause that is necessary for an arrest with or without a 
warrant exists “whenever facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the 
police and of which there was reasonably trustworthy information would warrant a 
prudent and cautious person to believe that the arrestee had committed [a] crime.”55
Although the standard for probable cause has “a very low threshold,”56 the 
justification for arrest still must be objectively reasonable.57 This probable cause 
                                                                                                                                      
49 Moreno v. Napolitano, 213 F.Supp.3d 999, 1005 (N.D. Ill. 2016); see also Cervantez v. 
Whitfield, 776 F.2d 556, 559-60 (5th Cir. 1985).
50 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
51 Gonzalez v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 476 (9th Cir. 1983) overruled on other grounds by
Hodgers–Durgin v. de la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (“[A]rrests for federal offenses 
can be justified by state law authorization only if the arrest procedures do not violate the federal 
Constitution.”); State v. Blier, 2017 ME 103, ¶ 8, 162 A.3d 829; Clifford v. Maine-General Med. Ctr.,
2014 ME 60, ¶ 67 n. 21, 91 A.3d 567.
52 ME. CONST. art. I, § 5.
53 State v. Gulick, 2000 ME 170, ¶ 10, 759 A.2d 1085 (“[W]hen the officer, by means of physical 
force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen . . . we conclude that a 
‘seizure’ has occurred.”).
54 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 704 (2015) (holding liable LEAs that execute an arrest warrant 
“wantonly or oppressively, or detain[] a person without a warrant longer than is necessary to procure 
it . . . .”).
55 State v. Johnson, 2014 ME 83, ¶ 11, 95 A.3d 621 (quoting State v. Foy, 662 A.2d 238, 240 (Me. 
1995); Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004) (“[A] warrantless arrest by a law officer is 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment where there is probable cause to believe that a criminal offense 
has been or is being committed.”).  A probable cause determination needs to be “particularized with 
respect to the person to be searched or seized.”  Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003).  This 
standard applies for arrests with or without a warrant.  Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 
(1963) (“Whether or not the requirements of reliability and particularity of the information on which an 
officer may act are more stringent where an arrest warrant is absent, they surely cannot be less stringent 
then where an arrest warrant is obtained.”).
56 State v. Lagasee, 2016 ME 158, ¶ 14, 149 A.3d 1153 (quoting State v. Webster, 2000 ME 115, ¶ 
7, 754 A.2d 976).
57 State v. Flint, 2011 ME 20, ¶ 12, 12 A.3d 54 (“[I]t is the objective view of the circumstances 
that matters; the arresting officer’s subjective belief regarding whether probable cause exists is not 
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determination requires a fact-specific analysis by a neutral magistrate,58 and 
includes the collective information known to the police.59 Importantly, in Maine, 
the police’s ability to execute a valid arrest of anyone, including a noncitizen, when 
they possess probable cause but neither a warrant nor reason to believe a crime has 
been committed, is restricted to a specific list of offenses defined by statute.60
Similarly, LEAs can arrest someone for a civil offense only in limited 
circumstances: Maine statute permits arrest or detention for noncriminal matters 
such as contempt of court,61 involuntary commitment of the mentally ill,62 material 
witness orders,63 failure to provide child support,64 and refusal to comply with 
monetary judgments.65 As compared to Massachusetts’ statutes, Maine’s 
noncriminal detention laws are more limited in scope.66 Massachusetts and Maine 
statutes and common law are similar, though, in that neither state provides to police 
the authority—using the language in Lunn—“to arrest generally for civil matters, 
let alone authority to arrest specifically for Federal civil immigration matters.”67
Ultimately, then, the permissibility of arresting a noncitizen in Maine for unlawful 
presence by holding them in compliance with an ICE detainer beyond any period of 
time authorized by a preexisting charge or conviction will depend on (1) whether a 
neutral magistrate has issued an arrest warrant after conducting a fact-specific 
analysis of probable cause and (2) if such an arrest falls within one of the 
categories under which police officers can execute an arrest for a civil offense.
When a noncitizen violates federal law by being unlawfully present, the 
noncitizen has committed a civil, non-criminal offense.  Therefore, the re-arrest of 
such a noncitizen solely for unlawful presence (as opposed to for the initial 
criminal offense that led to his detention) must be predicated on one of the 
justifications for arresting a person in Maine for a civil offense, which are clearly 
delineated in state statutes.  Just as in Massachusetts, Maine does not grant the 
police the power to arrest people for all civil violations, and none of the civil 
violations that justify an arrest in the relevant statutes—such as contempt of court 
or the involuntary commitment of the mentally ill—cover the arrest of a noncitizen 
for unlawful presence, either directly or tangentially.  Importantly, the specificity 
with which the Maine legislature has authorized noncriminal detention suggests a 
                                                                                                                                      
determinative.”).  See generally Fox v. Hayes, 600 F.3d 819, 834 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Probable cause may 
be a loose concept, but it leaves no room for the absurd.”).
58 State v. Martin, 2015 ME 91, ¶ 15, 120 A.3d 113; State v. Hawkins, 261 A.2d 255, 259 (1970) 
(“The policy of the law is that the existence or absence of probable cause shall be determined by a 
‘neutral and detached magistrate’ and not by ‘the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of 
ferreting out crime.’” (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 68 (1948))).
59 Lagasse, 2016 ME 158, ¶ 14, 149 A.3d 1153. 
60 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A § 15(1) (2015).; See Lagasee, 2016 ME 158, ¶ 13, 149 A.3d 
1153 (“law enforcement officers are authorized to make warrantless arrests under certain circumstances, 
including when an officer has probable cause to believe that a person has committed any Class A, Class 
B, or Class C crime.”).
61 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 § 3136(2) (2015).
62 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B §§ 3862(1), 3864 (2017).
63 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 1104 (2017).
64 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A § 2361(8) (2017).
65 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 § 3135 (2017).
66 See Lunn v. Commonwealth, 78 N.E.3d 1143, 1156 (Mass. 2017) (listing Massachusetts statutes 
that authorize detention of individuals in the following circumstances: “protective custody for 
intoxicated persons”; “emergency hospitalizations for mental illness”; “involuntary commitment of 
persons with alcohol and substance abuse orders”; “sexually dangerous persons”; “civil contempt for 
noncompliance with spousal or child support order”; and “material witnesses in criminal proceedings”).
67 Id. at 1155. 
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conscious exclusion of other justifications or circumstances. Therefore, it appears 
that arresting a noncitizen for unlawful presence in compliance with an ICE 
detainer is impermissible under Maine law because LEAs lack adequate probable 
cause to do so. This type of arrest for a civil violation is simply not authorized by 
statute. 
C. Neither Federal Statutes nor Section 287(g) Agreements Appear to Empower 
Maine Law Enforcement Officials to Conduct Arrests for Civil Violations of 
Immigration Law
The Supreme Court recently rejected the idea that states possess any 
“inherent authority” as sovereign entities to enforce immigration laws.68 Instead, 
the authority to arrest is a matter of state law, unless it is defined in federal 
statute.69 Federal law sets clear limits on the ability of state or local police officers 
to enforce federal immigration law.70 Federal law does not grant LEAs the 
authority to arrest an individual based solely on the possibility that the noncitizen is 
removable because this justification fails to provide the requisite probable cause for 
arrest.71 State and local police can only arrest noncitizens who are “illegally 
present in the United States” and have “previously been conflicted of a felony . . . 
and deported or left after such conviction” but only after obtaining “appropriate 
confirmation from [ICE] of the status of such individual[,] for such a period of time 
as may be required  . . . to take the individual into Federal custody[,]” and “to the 
extent permitted by relevant State and local law.”72
The power possessed by LEAs to enforce federal immigration law may be 
expanded through “cooperative” INA § 287(g) agreements73— a program through 
                                                                                                                                      
68 Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 396, 410 (2012) (“By . . . authorizing state and local 
officers to engage in these enforcement activities as a general matter, [a state law permitting warrantless 
arrests for certain civil immigration violations] creates an obstacle to the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress.”); see also IRA J. KURZBAN, IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK 425 (15th ed. 2016) (“The 
notion of 'inherent authority' to arrest and detain undocumented persons . . . has been seriously 
undermined in Arizona.”).
69 United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 589 (1948) (“In [the] absence of an applicable federal 
statute the law of the state where an arrest without warrant takes place determines its validity.”).
70 See Arizona, 567 U.S. at 408 (“Federal law specifies limited circumstances in which state 
officers may perform the functions of an immigration officer.”).
71 See id. at 407 (“If the police stop someone based on nothing more than possible removability, 
the usual predicate for an arrest is absent.”).
72 8 U.S.C. § 1252c(a) (2012).
73 Former DHS Secretary John Kelly revived the “Secure Communities” program and expanded 
the use of 287(g) agreements to enforce federal immigration law soon after the Trump administration 
came to power. Memorandum from DHS Secretary John Kelly, Enforcement of the Immigration Laws to 
Serve the National Interest (Feb. 20, 2017), available at 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/17_0220_S1_Enforcement-of-the-Immigration-
Laws-to-Serve-the-National-Interest.pdf [https://perma.cc/M2FC-P5BT]. There has already been a 
significant uptick in LEAs entering into 287(g) agreements since Trump took office with twenty nine 
departments joining this year and “scores” of other LEAs contacting the Justice Department to express 
their interest. Mica Rosenberg & Reade Levinson, Police in Trump-Supporting Towns Aid Immigration 
Officials in Crackdown, Reuters (Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-trump-effect-
immigration-police/police-in-trump-supporting-towns-aid-immigration-officials-in-crackdown-
idUSKBN1DR169 [https://perma.cc/YKG6-PUY9]. There are currently no Maine police departments 
abiding by a 287(g) agreement. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Delegation of Immigration 
Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act, https://www.ice.gov/factsheets/287g 
[https://perma.cc/8N4E-MR7U].
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which DHS deputizes police officers as “immigration officers.”74 These agreements 
are entered into voluntarily.75 Any additional authority granted by the agreement 
applies only to incidences during which local police and federal officers are 
working cooperatively while under the supervision of the Attorney General.76 Even 
if federal law, state law, or a 287(g) agreement permits local police to enforce 
federal immigration laws, this authority only extends to criminal matters.77 Any 
power granted to state officials to arrest noncitizens pursuant to federal law is also 
circumscribed by procedural limits on arrests contained within the federal 
Constitution.78
Federal statutes do not seem to grant state or local law enforcement the 
power to arrest individuals for civil violations of federal immigration law without a 
warrant. Therefore, it is likely that a court in Maine would find that police 
departments lack the necessary legal authority to hold noncitizens in accordance 
with ICE detainers absent a clear state law justification for such an arrest. Federal 
law specifically limits the situations in which local police can execute federal 
immigration law, and case law suggests that even if the local police have this 
authority—whether it be through a 287(g) agreement or a federal statute—it may 
be limited to criminal matters for which they already possess the authority to arrest 
individuals under state law. Therefore, it appears that police forces in Maine lack 
the requisite authority to enforce civil federal immigration law that might justify 
the holding of a suspected noncitizen in response to an ICE detainer request.
IV. CONCLUSION
The decision in Lunn opens up a new front in the resistance against the use 
of ICE detainers to enforce federal immigration policy across the country in states 
with similar common law and statutory frameworks to Massachusetts. With the 
constitutional footing of the practice significantly weakened by recent federal 
cases,79 state courts are positioned to be major players in the inevitable future 
debates about the appropriate means by which to police immigration and the degree 
                                                                                                                                      
74 See INA §§ 287(g)(1), (3) (“[T]he Attorney General may enter into a written agreement with a 
State, or any political subdivision of a State, . . . who is determined by the Attorney General to be 
qualified to perform a function of an immigration officer in relation to its investigation, apprehension, or 
detention of aliens . . . subject to the direction and supervision of the Attorney General.”); Kelly, supra 
note 73 (“The INA § 287(g) Program has been a highly successful force multiplier that allows a 
qualified state or local law enforcement officer . . . to perform all law enforcement functions specified in 
section 287(a) of the INA, including the authority to . . .  arrest [noncitizens] . . . under the direction and 
supervision of the [DHS].”).
75 INA § 287(g)(9) (“Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to require any State or political 
subdivision of a State to enter into an agreement with the Attorney General under this subsection.”).
76 See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 410 (2012) (“There may be some ambiguity as to 
what constitutes cooperation under the federal law; but no coherent understanding of the term would 
incorporate the unilateral decision of state officers to arrest an alien for being removable absent any 
request, approval, or other instruction from the Federal Government.”).
77 See Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1001 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[I]f the [local police] are to 
enforce immigration-related laws, they must enforce only immigration-related laws that are criminal in 
nature, which they are permitted to do even without section 287(g) authority.”); Gonzalez v. City of 
Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 476 (9th Cir. 1983), overruled on other grounds by Hodgers–Durgin v. de la Vina, 
199 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (“We . . . conclude that state law authorizes [local] police to 
enforce the criminal provisions of the [INA] . . . [and] [w]e firmly emphasize . . . that this authorization 
is limited to criminal violations.”).
78 Gonzalez, 722 F.2d at 477.
79 See supra text accompanying note 24.
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to which LEAs will be part of these policies. State courts, such as those in Maine, 
are likely to be called upon soon to enter into the fray and look at the intersection 
of state statute, common law, and federal immigration law as it pertains to ICE 
detainers. Their decisions may serve as a bulwark against any changes to federal 
policy or law that are likely to result as the Trump administration squares off 
against “sanctuary cities” and other actors resistant to his crackdown on illegal 
immigration. 
Fundamentally, Lunn changes the dynamics of the struggle because it 
provides an avenue for practitioners to go on the offensive—particularly in states 
resistant to any challenges to ICE detainers or unlikely to resolve the issue 
legislatively. If an ICE detainer qualifies as an arrest under state law and there is no 
state statutory grant of power to conduct warrantless arrests for civil violations of 
immigration law, then it is likely that a state court will rule that detainers are 
unlawful.80 The federal precedents are clear: unlawful presence is a civil offense, 
ICE detainers are warrantless because there is no oversight when they are issued by 
a neutral magistrate, and LEAs cannot unilaterally enforce civil federal 
immigration law, even if they enter into a 287(g) agreement with the Justice 
Department.81 Unless federal courts take a radical turn and override these 
precedents, practitioners should feel empowered to rely on current federal law to 
support a strike against the ICE detainer system.
Even with this current advantage, practitioners in conservative states need 
to be mindful of how their state’s government may respond to fill the breach and 
eliminate the vulnerability of ICE detainers from attack on state law grounds. 
Immediately after the Lunn decision came down, Charlie Baker, the Republican 
governor of Massachusetts, proposed that the legislature pass a law specifically 
providing for LEAs to conduct arrests for civil violations of federal immigration 
law.82 Although it never passed, Baker did correctly identify the reliance of the 
Lunn court on the “statutory gap” under current Massachusetts law that—if filled—
                                                                                                                                      
80 Conducting a fifty state analysis is beyond the scope of this Note, but it is still worth 
highlighting the fact that ICE detainers may be vulnerable to attack on state law grounds even in 
conservative jurisdictions like Texas. Texas defines an arrest slightly differently than Maine and 
Massachusetts by asking its courts to analyze five variables: “(1) the amount of force displayed; (2) the 
duration of a detention; (3) the efficiency of the investigative process and whether it is conducted at the 
original location . . . ; (4) the officer’s expressed intent . . . ; and (5) any other relevant factors.” 
Melendez v. State, 467 S.W.3d. 586, 592-93 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).  Although these variables may be 
weighed differently by different courts, the ultimate test is “whether a reasonable person would perceive 
the detention to be a restraint on his movement comparable to a formal arrest . . . .” Id. at 592 (quoting
State v. Ortiz, 382 S.W.3d 367, 372 (Tex. Crim. App.2012). Texas statute defines a “warrant of arrest,” 
inter alia, as “a written order from a magistrate,” meaning that ICE detainers are not “warrant[s] of 
arrest” under state law. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 15.01 (West 2015).  To conduct a warrantless 
arrest, Texas LEAs must possess either probable cause or specific statutory authority to do so. Dansby v. 
State, 530 S.W.3d 213, 220 (Tex. App. 2017).   Just as in Maine and Massachusetts, Texas statutes fail 
to provide such authority in regards to arrests for civil violations of federal immigration law. See art. 
14.01-.04.  Therefore, it is possible that ICE detainers may violate Texas state common law—even 
though the state has recently passed legislation to force LEAs to honor them. See Barragan, supra note 
11 (describing the state’s efforts to proscribe compliance with ICE detainers).
81 See supra text accompanying note 74.  Although these agreements may provide additional 
authority for LEAs to enforce criminal immigration law, courts have unanimously declined to extend 
this power to civil enforcement. See supra text accompanying note 77.
82 Claire Parker, Baker Proposes Bill to Tighten Immigration Enforcement, BOS. GLOBE (Aug. 1, 
2017), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2017/08/01/baker-files-bill-allow-local-law-enforcement-
detain-certain-unauthorized-immigrants/58RpjL2RqjGDkAxvtomcfM/story.html 
[https://perma.cc/549J-6U6J].
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might provide sufficient legal justification for honoring ICE detainers in the state.83
It is worth noting, though, that even if such steps might address the state 
law problem with ICE detainers or decrease LEA’s liability, they would not cure 
the underlying constitutional weaknesses exposed by several federal courts84 and 
acknowledged by numerous LEAs across the country.85 The awareness by LEAs of 
these issues has already had a chilling effect in some states because they fear the 
increased exposure to liability that accompanies being complicit in honoring 
detainers.86 But the resistance has not been universal, as evidenced by Texas’s 
attempt to compel LEAs to honor ICE detainers87 and the threat by Maine 
Governor LePage to fire sheriffs who do not comply.88 Although the constitutional 
challenge remains, it is certainly possible—even likely—that states with unified 
governments that support the use of ICE detainers will be able to quickly 
counterattack by fixing whatever state statutory “gaps” make the practice unlawful. 
This eventuality means that the power of Lunn will be limited primarily to states 
with divided governments, like Maine, that are unlikely to resolve the issue 
legislatively. 
Another novel response by LEAs interested in protecting the ICE detainer 
system, not from attack on state law grounds, but from federal constitutional 
challenges is for the LEA to coordinate with ICE directly so that ICE, not the LEA, 
take custody of the noncitizen immediately.89 This custodial sleight of hand 
involves the LEA leasing a prison cell to ICE so that as soon as the term of the 
original detention on state law grounds expires, the noncitizen is placed in an 
“ICE” cell.90 Although this may appear at first blush to fix the constitutional defect 
with ICE detainers, it actually demonstrates how proponents fundamentally 
misunderstand the problem.91 Even if ICE immediately takes custody, the Fourth 
Amendment requires that any LEA—including ICE—get a warrant from a 
detached and neutral magistrate92, meaning that the warrantless arrest93 that takes 
                                                                                                                                      
83 Id.
84 ACLU, supra note 24 (listing federal court decisions).
85 Dickerson, supra note 4.
86 Id. 
87 Barragan, supra note 11.
88 Murray, supra note 25.  It is ultimately quite ironic that Maine sheriffs may, in fact, be following 
state law by not honoring ICE detainers—even if they and Governor LePage are currently unaware. 
89 Dickerson, supra note 10.
90 Id. 
91 See Kagan, supra note 13, at 128-29, 132 (“The principal constitutional problem with 
immigration enforcement is that a person may be deprived of liberty without any prompt review by a 
neutral magistrate to determine if probable cause exists to justify the arrest and continued custody . . .
[and], in most removal cases there is no neutral determination about deportability [for unlawful 
presence] until the conclusion of removal proceedings in immigration court.”).
92 See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) ([The] Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful 
only when it is assured that at some point the conduct of [law enforcement officers] can be subjected to 
the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the reasonableness of a particular 
search or seizure in light of the particular circumstances.”); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 
(1948) (“The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that 
it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from 
evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached 
magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting 
out crime.”). Critically, the Fourth Amendment does not differentiate between citizens and noncitizens. 
See, e.g., Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973); Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149 
(1923); Manuel, supra note 5.
93 See supra note 34 for an extensive discussion. 
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place when a noncitizen is held in ICE’s cell is still likely unconstitutional.
Although there is likely to be a substantial response by either the Trump 
administration or state governments that are in favor of the current crackdown on 
illegal immigration to any attack, Lunn provided an opening salvo in a conflict that 
may well topple the ICE detainer system as it currently exists. Lunn exclaims a 
worthy battle cry for practitioners in states in which the legality of ICE detainers 
remains unsettled, and it is time for them to hear its message loud and clear. 
